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Network forensicsconcerns the identificationandpreservationofevidence fromanevent thathas
occurredorislikelytooccur.Thescopeofnetworkforensicsencompassesthenetworks,systemsand
devicesassociatedwiththephysicalandhumannetworks.Inthispaperweareassessingtheforensic
potential of a router in investigations.  A single router is taken as a case study and analysed to
determine its forensic value from both static and live investigation perspectives. In the live
investigation, tests using steps from two to seven routers were used to establish benchmark








Digital forensics concerns the investigation of any matter of information or data, stored or
transmittedinabinaryformthatmayberelieduponasevidence.Asaconsequencemanyspecialist
sub fields are encapsulated by digital forensics including network forensics, computer forensics,
satellite forensics, browser forensics and so on (Balen,Martinovic & Hocenski, 2012). This paper
concerns Network forensics and the one instance that of the router (Battisha, 2008). A network
forensic investigationrequiresthecapturing,recordingandanalysingofnetworkevidenceandthe








Digital investigationconcernsscientific tasks, techniquesandpracticesused inthe investigationof
storedortransmittedbinary informationordata.Thescopeof investigationisboundedbydevices
andsystemsinwhichbinarydataistransmitted,processedandstored.Thepeopleassociatedwith
the networks and computing systems are also in scope and may provide valuable evidence and
access to evidence. In these senses the deliverable from an investigation is evidence for the
requirements of an IT audit, a post event system hardening, or legal action. In each instance the
theoreticalframeworkforcollectionandthemethodsforprocessingtheevidencearedifferent(see
Figure1).An ITaudit (internalorexternal) is conducted toassess theperformanceof thesecurity
controls against benchmarks and risk criteria (Figure 1: A). These audits include forensic audit of
breaches and security audits of vulnerabilities. The scope is based on the determined audit
objectives; for exampleof security (confidentiality, integrity and availability), quality (effectiveness
andefficiency),fiduciary(complianceandreliability),serviceandcapacity(Cui,Xu,Xu,&Wu,2002).
TheoutcomeofanITAuditisareportthataddressestheauditobjective.SecurityauditandDigital
forensic investigationoverlap in theareaofpostevent evaluation (see Figure1:B). Security audit
providesanexplanationofaneventintermsofthevariationaroundcontrolsandcanshowsystem




implement system improvement in IT terms.  In the same spaceDigital forensic investigationmay
alsooccurtoexplainthesameeventintermsofthelegalconsequences.Theconsequencesmaybe
toprosecuteanattacker,defendagainstprosecutionoranyotherrelatedlegalaction.Theoutputof
such investigation isa technical report that isprepared inaccordancewith the rules foranexpert
witness and using professional processes that are compliantwith the admissibility of evidence to
courts.This reporthasdifferentcriteriaandevidencecollectionmethods thana report forsystem
improvementandmaybeequallyappliedtoareasBandC(seeFigure1:C).Thelegalreportfrom











the security system. Unlike computer forensics thatmainly deals with imaging static evidence in
physical devices such as hard drives, memory sticks and other digital repositories; traditional
networkforensicsisliveandlargelydealswithnetworkpacketfilters,firewallsandwirelessframes
(Gottlieb,Greenberg,Rexford&Wang,2003).However,suchascopebetterfitsareaBofFigure1.In
area C of Figure 1 the scope of network forensics requires the investigator to have the ability to
determinethefullextentofnetworkrelatedevidencethat is inclusiveofthenetwork,thedevices
andsystemsassociatedandthepeopleinvolved.Suchascopeiswiderthanthetraditionalviewof
network forensics and involves theoretical frameworks that are IT related, legally related and
mediating mechanisms to facilitate differences. The focus of such investigation requirements
extends the scope of network forensic investigation into multidisciplinary domains and towards
multitasking outcomes based on the classification by use of system investigation evidence
(Hiromori,Yamaguchi,Yasumoto,Higashinoz&Taniguchi,2003).

“This is the time to change our focus from the negative (hacker) to the positive





The current scope of network forensics is to be inclusive of social networks and to consider the
preparationofanetworkforinvestigation(Kadloor,Gong,Kiyavash,&Venkitasubramaniam,2010).
The scope includes both static and live evidence and consequently techniques for the forensic
processesofcollection,examination,analysisandreportingofdigitalevidencemustbeappropriate







forensic analysis or examination of acquired evidence, and the presentation and reporting of the
obtained digital evidence in an appropriate manner (Lijun, Dan, Zhang & Rayehauduri, 2011).
Forensically ready systems have designed subsystems to collect acceptable evidence and to
minimisethecostofsuchactivity(McHugh,McLeod&Nagaonkar,2008).Anorganisationmayalso











A router is a network device that forwards data packets to other components of a computer
network.Fundamentallytherouterreceivesincomingdatapackets,readstheheaderinformation,
determines a destination and then forwards packet appropriately (McMillan, 2011). The
determinationofdestinationismadebytheembeddedroutingtablefortheparticularrouter(Misra
&Kharoliwalla,2001).Thefunctionoftherouterisoperationalintwoplanes;thecontrolplanethat


















to enhance the performance of router path calculations and improve the general through put of
packets (Narayan, Lutui, Vijayakumar & Sodhi, 2010). Although these enhancements have been
made for performance reasons the benefit is also for static retention of evidence buffer load by









actions may be taken to block traffic by profile identification, load balancing or header sniffing.
Where theoriginofapacket ishiddenby spoofing the source IPaddressesdifferent IP traceback
mechanismsweredeveloped andmost of them fall into the fourmain categories of; linktesting
hopbyhop tracing,messaging, loggingandpacketmarking’[22,23].These tracebackmechanisms
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were developed according to various situations and most of them depend on collecting a huge
amountofpacketsfromtheroutersalongtheattackingpath.Withoutcollectingsufficientpackets,
tracing back the hackers is extremely hard and sometimes impossible.  Although trace back
mechanismscanbeveryeffectiveandpreciseintracingbackthehackers,itmaybetoocostlyand
complicated to implement.  Instead of collecting the stream of packets from the routers to
reconstruct the attacking path, the TimeToLive (TTL) field within theIP packet provides another






Mian, 2009). Principally the identification of storage repositories, the relative capacities, refresh
rates and allocation algorithms are sufficient to fit an investigation scope. However, live forensic
acquisition is more complex and requires many networked routers. In this research we selected
Cisco2800seriesroutersbecausetheywereavailableinthelaboratoryandtheysupporteddynamic
routing in IPv6 (Sarikhani,Mahranian&Hoseini,2010).Thenetworkarchitecturewaskept simple
andstartedwithtworouters(seeFigure4)andwasthenscaleduptofourandsevenrouters.Ofthe
many factors influencing liveanalysiswe selectedmeasuresof throughput in relationpacket size,
























and receiver can act as the log servers. There were no other settings changed to enhance the












adds variation to the amount and extent of evidence that may be available. The two problems
arisingintheresearchthathaveimplicationsforinvestigatorsarethevolatilityofdatainthestatic
analysisandtheimmensevolumeofdataintheliveanalysis.Evidencefrominvestigationishencea
































(forexampleTTL fieldmetrics, tracebackandsoon) (Paruchuri,Durresi&Chellappan (2008);Pilli,
Joshi&Niyogi,2011a&b);andvaluabletoourresearch.Ourfocuswastotestforothervariations
thathaveaninfluenceontheidentificationofnetworkevidenceandtoreportmeasuresthatshow
the expected variations as benchmark measures (Vacca, 2005; Wei, 2005). The approach was
































IPv4 UDP vs IPv6 UDP on Network 
with 2 Routers
IPv4 - UDP 2 
Routers
















IPv4 UDP vs IPv6 UDP on Network 
with 4 Routers
IPv4 - UDP 4 
Routers

















IPv4 UDP vs IPv6 UDP on Network 
with 7 Routers
IPv4 - UDP 7 
Routers














on all network setups. With the 2 router network, packet sizes 256, 768 and 1024 Bytes, IPv6
performancedroppedby5%.Therestofthepacketsizesareverysimilarinregardstothroughput
values. On the network with 4 routers, packet sizes ranging from 256 to 1536 Bytes, IPv6
performancedroppedby10%.Onthenetworkwith7routers,forallpacketsizesrangingfrom256
to1536Bytes,IPv6performancedroppedby3%.Fromtheseresults,itcanbeconcludedthatasthe
packet size increases, IPv6 performance degrades as compared to IPv4. These variations require
considerationin liveforensicevidencecollectionasastandardrouterperformancewillnecessarily
varywithin theoverallnetworkperformanceandalso in relationtoother factors identified in the



























IPv4 TCP vs IPv6 TCP on Network 
with 2 Routers
IPv4 - TCP 2 
Routers


































IPv4 TCP vs IPv6 TCP on Network 
with 4 Routers
IPv4 - TCP 4 
Routers


































IPv4 TCP vs IPv6 TCP on Network 
with 7 Routers
IPv4 - TCP 7 
Routers


























These variations for protocol, packet size and network complexity require consideration in live
forensicevidencecollectionasastandardrouterperformancewillnecessarilyvarywithintheoverall

















concluded that, as the number of network nodes increases, IPv6 protocol generatesmore delays
than IPv4 protocol. These delays for an expected distribution and events falling outside of these


































delay irrespective of packet size than a network of 2 routers running on IPv4. In network of 4
routers,alsousingTCPasthetransportprotocol,IPv4hasanaverageof42millisecondslessdelay
irrespectiveofpacketsize,thannetworkof4routersrunningonIPv6.Whenincreasingthenumber
of network nodes to 7 routers, the network running on IPv6, using TCP as transmission protocol
again has more average delay than the IPv4. For a packet size of 64 Bytes in particular, IPv6




Based on all of the above statements and the relevant charts,it can be concluded that, as the
numberofnetworknodesincreases,irrespectiveofpacketsize,IPv6protocolgeneratesmoredelays
thanIPv4protocol.Thesearedelaysforanexpecteddistributionandeventsfallingoutsideofthese
benchmarksmaybe interpretedasexceptions. Suchexceptions require investigationwhereas the
valueswithin the expected distributionmay only require content analysis. Our research helps an




Thescopeofdigital investigationandnetwork forensicsoughtto includerouters.Wehaveshown
thatfrombothastaticandaliveperspectivevaluableevidencemaybefoundinrouters.Ourtests
have shown that various factors contribute to network performance and these variations can be
expectedinthenormalfunctionofacomputernetwork.Hencenormalvariationsthatareincontrol



























IPv4 vs IPv6 - TCP Average Delay
IPv4 2Routers
IPv6 2Routers
IPv4 4Routers
IPv6 4Routers
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IPv6 7Routers
Packet Size (Bytes)
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